No. 72-1014.United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6) June 23, 1972.
Decided July 12, 1972.
Page 687
Stephen Apollo, Asst. Deputy Public Defender, Newark, N. J., Stanley C. Van Ness, Newark, N. J., Public Defender for petitioner-appellant.
David Noah Dubrow, Joseph P. Lordi, Essex County Prosecutor, Newark, N. J., for appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.
Before ALDISERT, JAMES ROSEN and HUNTER, Circuit Judges.
[1] OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM:
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question, Rome picked out relator as the one who had done the actual slugging.
[7] In his testimony at a hearing out of the presence of the jury, the witness Rome recounted the events at the tavern, including the identification of relator there, and identified relator in court as the one who slugged the decedent. Further questioning revealed that Rome had seen relator for a considerable time in the tavern prior to the slugging; that he had seen the motion of the fatal punch although he had not seen the punch land because a pole was in the way; that after the slugging he saw that the man who had thrown the punch was relator; and that after the punch the relator yelled “knockout” and left the tavern. The trial judge held that the identification in the tavern would be admissible at trial, along with the in-court identification.[1] [8] Since this appeal has been pending, the Supreme Court has decided Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972). That case held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at lineups, recognized in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), does not extend to those lineups that take place prior to commencement of “adversary judicial criminal proceedings.” 406 U.S. at 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877.[2] Because Kirby has thus limited Wade, and because in the present case formal proceedings against relator had not begun at the time of the out-of-court identification, relator had no right to counsel at the identification. Therefore we have no reason to decide whether the identification was a proper on-the-scene identification within the scope of United States v. Gaines, 450 F.2d 186, 196-198 (3d Cir. 1971). [9] Even through relator had no right to counsel at his on-the-scene identification, that identification nevertheless should have been excluded from his trial if it was carried on in a manner that was “unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification.” Kirby v. Illinois, supra, 405 U.S. at 691, 92 S.Ct. at 1883, citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), and Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969). We have examined the record with care and we are convinced that the identification of relator in the tavern was not unnecessarily suggestive or conducive to misidentification. Thus admission of the identification at relator’s trial was not improper. SeeStovall v. Denno, supra; United States v. Gaines, supra. [10] Relator’s final argument is that his identification by the witness Rome in court was improper since it was “tainted” by the identification in the tavern and by Rome’s exposure to relator’s photograph prior to the trial. Because we hold that the identification in the tavern was not improper, we need not consider whether the in-court identification was “tainted” by that identification. Rome’s testimony at the pretrial hearing established, however, that his in-court identification was not based on the lineup or upon the photograph, but was based upon his observations of relator prior to and during the time that the slugging took place. There was no “taint.” [11] The District Court’s order dismissing the petition will be affirmed.
[1] The witness Rome had also identified the relator from photographs, but the trial judge excluded evidence of the photographic identification. He found, however, that Rome’s in-court identification was not “tainted” by the photographic identification, but instead rested upon an independent basis.
[2] Although only four justices joined in the opinion of Justice Stewart, who announced the result, the opinion of Justice Powell, who concurred in the result, indicates his agreement with this reading of Kirby.
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