Reesa ADAMS, Appellant v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security.

No. 07-3902.United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) May 23, 2008.
Filed: May 29, 2008.

Page 149

[EDITOR’S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 06-cv-01427), District Judge: The Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose.

Karl E. Osterhout, Pittsburgh, PA, for Appellant.

Brian C. O’Donnell, Social Security Administration OGC/Region III, Philadelphia, PA, for Jo Anne B. Barnhart.

Before: M. SMITH, HARDIMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.

Reesa Adams appeals from the decision of the District Court affirming the Commissioner’s denial of her claim for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401433. Because our opinion is wholly without precedential value, and because the parties and the District Court are familiar with its operative facts, we offer only an abbreviated recitation to explain why we will affirm the decision of the District Court.

Adams did not dispute the ALJ’s findings, adopted by the Commissioner, with regard to her physical impairments. Rather, she argued that the ALJ erred in denying her claim of mental impairment. We agree with the District Court that the decision adopted by the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence.

In the decision adopted by the Commissioner, it was recognized that Adams had a mental impairment. Nonetheless, upon engaging the required sequential evaluation of the evidence (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520), it was determined that Adams’ impairment did not limit her basic activities or work, and only slightly limited her in social function, concentration, and persistent activity. See Petition of Sullivan, 904 F.2d 826, 845
(3d Cir. 1990). Additionally, it was noted that Adams did not suffer any episodes of prolonged decompensation related to her mental condition. These factual findings reasonably supported the overall conclusion that Adams’ mental impairments did not significantly limit her ability to perform basic work activities over a twelvemonth period, and that her impairment was therefore not “severe,” as would be necessary to support a disability claim. See Newell v. Comm’r of Social Security, 347 F.3d 541 (3d Cir. 2003).

For all of these reasons, we will affirm the decision of the District Court.