Dennis C. ACKER, Appellant v. COCA-COLA NORTH AMERICA.

No. 07-4257.United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) October 30, 2008.
Filed: November 4, 2008.

[EDITOR’S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

On Appeal From the United States District Court For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 06-cv-03670), District Judge: Hon. Thomas M. Golden.

Page 410

Donald P. Russo, Esq., Bethlehem, PA, for Appellant.

Matthew A. Boyd, Esq., Michael W. Johnston, Esq., King Spalding Elizabeth F. Johnson, Esq., The Coca-Cola Company, Atlanta, GA, for Appellee.

BEFORE: SLOVITER, STAPLETON and TASHIMA,[*] Circuit Judges.

[*] Hon. A. Wallace Tashima, Senior United States Circuit Judge For the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.

OPINION OF THE COURT
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Dennis Acker maintains that appellee Coca-Cola North America (1) in violation of state law, terminated his employment in retaliation for his having “filed worker’s compensation petitions to seek a remedy for . . . injuries” he sustained at work (Appellant’s Br. at 7), (2) failed to accommodate his disability in violation of the ADA, and (3) discriminated against him in violation of the ADA by denying him overtime because of his disability.

The District Court granted summary judgment for Coca-Cola. We will affirm for the reasons set forth in the thorough and persuasive opinion of the District Court. Appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of failure to accommodate and did not exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his overtime claim. Finally, as the District Court concluded, “[t]he undisputed facts reveal that rather than discriminate or retaliate against Plaintiff, Defendant went out of its way to assist Plaintiff by taking Plaintiff for immediate medical attention, promptly reporting the incident to its workers’ compensation carrier, helping Plaintiff through the benefits process and, most significantly, provided Plaintiff with modified work assignments for nearly six years even though its policies limited Plaintiff to a period of 90 days.” App. at 10-11.

The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.